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Abstract: The core sense of pistis as understood in Posterior Analytics, De Anima,
and the Rhetoric is not that of a logical relation in which cognitively grasped
propositions stand in respect to one another, but the result of an act of socially
embedded interpersonal communication, a willing acceptance of guidance offered
in respect to action. Even when pistis seems to have an exclusively epistemological
sense, this focal meaning of pistis is implicit; to have pistis in a proposition is to
willingly accept that proposition as a basis for some kind of activity (albeit possibly
theoretical) as a result of some kind of communicative act. This is in accordance
with Aristotle’s understanding of argumentation as a social practice, entered into
in order lead others to certain actions, for certain ends. Understanding pistis in this
way allows us to understand how it is that pistis admits of quantitative variation.
Keywords: Aristotle, persuasion, rhetoric, reason, argumentation

Logic, Argument, and Pistis
There is more to argument than what is studied by logic. Logic regards arguments
as bare inferential structures, “disregarding the actual reasoning processes and
the contextual surroundings in which they take place”.1 Such a study neglects
many aspects of inference and argument of philosophical interest; these have been
the concern of argumentation theorists. They have emphasized that argumentation is a cognitive and social act which people do, and any adequate understanding of argument must make the interpersonal aspect of argument central to
its analysis.2 This is one of the main teachings of Aristotle’s Rhetoric as well.

1 Van Eemeren–Grootendorst–Henkemans (1996) 6.
2 “Argumentation is a social activity, which in principle is directed at other people. Of course, the
social nature of argumentation is most clearly evident in a discourse between two or more interlocutors. All the same, even when people are conferring with themselves, contemplating the
pros and cons of their own ideas, their conduct is basically social . . . [attempting] to meet the
outspoken or tacit reactions of others” (van Eemeren–Grootendorst–Henkemans 1996, 3).
*Corresponding author: Owen Goldin, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI, USA,
E-mail: Owen.Goldin@Marquette.edu
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It was Aristotle himself who formalized logic. The work in which he did so, the
Prior Analytics, was presented as a propaedeutic to the epistemology and philosophy of science worked through in the Posterior Analytics.3 Its concerns however
are not divorced from those of the Rhetoric. Like the everyday beliefs that are the
basis of civic life, scientiﬁc knowledge comes about by means of a kind of argument (demonstration). Because argument plays a leading role in the process by
which both kinds of belief come about, Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of
science call for integration with his more general theory of argumentation. Little
scholarship has been devoted to this task. Perhaps scholars have been dissuaded
by Aristotle’s own words, for he sharply distinguishes rhetorical and dialectical
arguments, on the one hand, from scientiﬁc arguments, on the other. Aristotle
makes abundantly clear that the inferences with which rhetoric is concerned,
enthymemes, fall short of the formal criteria of syllogisms. Furthermore, enthymematic premises do not satisfy the criteria of necessity and causal priority that
must be met by true demonstrative premises.4 This might suggest that those
interested in logic and the nature of scientiﬁc explanation of necessary features of
the world have little to learn from the Rhetoric, and that the epistemology presupposed by the Analytics has little of interest for those interested in Aristotle’s
rhetorical theory. To think so, however, is a mistake. Demonstrations, like
rhetorical speeches, are communicative acts, by virtue of which one person
teaches and another learns, and accordingly need to be ultimately understood in
the context of Aristotle’s more general views of logos as a communicative practice.
The knowledge that comes about through demonstration, like the ethical knowledge which is instilled through the practice of rhetoric, can only be understood as
resulting from a social practice.
Different branches of philosophy study different kinds of cognition. Argumentation theory studies how people come to be persuaded in the context of their
social life; epistemology and philosophy of science studies how people come to
know. Contemporary philosophy is coming to the realization that these two areas
are closely related; the growing field of social epistemology studies the acquisition

3 “We must begin by saying with what our inquiry is concerned and what [branch of knowledge] it
belongs to: it is concerned with demonstration and belongs to the science of demonstration”. APr. I
1.24a10–11.
4 “An enthymeme is a syllogism of a kind” (Rhet. I 1.1355a8 and II 24.1400b35–1401a1). An
enthymeme is a “degenerate deduction that can be applied”. “An enthymeme is a syllogism from
likelihoods or signs” (APr. II 27.70a10). Burnyeat (1994) 10–21, (1996) 94–96 has defended this
translation of tis sullogismos. The sense is that an enthymeme is a “degenerate deduction that can
be applied to contexts where conclusive proof is not to be had” (18).
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of knowledge as a social process embedded in shared communicative practices.5
Aristotle himself integrates epistemology and the study of interpersonal communication, as can be most clearly seen in his rhetorical theory. The appointment of
citizens to ofﬁce is the sort of matter with which rhetorical speeches are concerned,
for it deals with an action about which people deliberate. That a certain candidate
is qualiﬁed is, for Aristotle, a factual matter, insofar as the qualiﬁed will be
virtuous, and virtues are real dispositions that people may or may not possess. This
fact that someone has these qualiﬁcations is not a matter of demonstrative science
(as it concerns contingent particulars), but, like science, it is understood on the
basis of foundationally known truths. But a speech by which someone can come to
know this fact, providing a source or justiﬁcation for my private evaluation of the
candidate’s qualiﬁcations, cannot be sharply distinguished from a rhetorical
speech inducing its audience to action. Rather, its primary goal is to persuade me
to act in a certain way, to vote in a certain way, and it is a successful act of
communication only if it results in such action. In this case, persuading others to
act in a certain way, within a certain social context, is more basic than the
persuasion to believe that something is true. Propositions with ontological import,
supported by valid inference are one aspect of the activity of logos whose primary
concern is shared action.6
Consider Aristotle’s teleological explanation of why, in contrast to other animals which have phone, adequate for the indication of pain and pleasure, only
human beings have logos. He tells us that logos “reveals the advantageous and the
harmful, and accordingly, the just and the unjust” (Pol. I 1.1253a8–18).7 Human
logos has the purpose of guiding other members of the community to useful and
noble actions.8 This passage is a bit of an embarrassment for those who understand
the political life as instrumental to the primary good of theoria, which culminates
5 For example, suppose someone tells me that it is raining. A traditional empiricist account would
have it that I infer that it is raining on the basis of the past reliability of such reports. The claim of
some social epistemologists is that my belief that it is indeed raining immediately follows. See
Schmitt (1998).
6 For an example of such an approach in contemporary rhetorical theory, see Crosswhite (1996) 3:
“The theory the book develops is justiﬁed not by logical or metaphysical standards, but by the
degree to which it accomplishes worthy social aims. In fact, the book reinterprets logic itself as a
social–ethical ideal”. Aristotle would not, however, concur with Crosswhite’s further assertion
that metaphysics is “a particular social–historical strategy to defend reasoning”. Rather, it is
Aristotle’s metaphysics that grounds his proto–social epistemology. It is a metaphysically robust
account of human nature that grounds his understanding of human beings as both political and
rational, according to which the political and rational are necessarily mutually implicated.
7 See also Pol. VII 13.1332a38–b9, where logos is taken to be intrinsically associated with the pistis
that arises through social interaction.
8 See also GA V 7.786b23–25 and DA II 8.420b29–33.
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in an individual’s cognitive grasp of how things are. Yet it must be taken seriously.
Rationality for Aristotle is derivative of speech, speech is something that people
do, and they do it in order to persuade people to do other things.9
This is not, of course, to deny that Aristotle understands theoretical activity to
partially consist in discursive thinking structurally parallel to propositional
speech, which in turn represents reality as it is. There are seams between Aristotle’s
metaphysics – according to which human beings are social, physical organisms
that do physical things – and his philosophy of mind and logic, which seem to
require propositions and beliefs to have the status of being a kind of entity, which
sits ill with his ontology insofar as they do not fit neatly into any of the categories.
But as much as possible these need to be integrated; Aristotle’s Rhetoric needs to be
understood in light of the rest of his writings and vice versa.
Pistis is a term importantly employed in both contexts. A clear understanding
of what the varieties of pistis are and how they are related is necessary for integration of Aristotle’s rhetoric and his epistemology. The term refers to the cognitive
state of an auditor of a successful rhetorical speech as well as of a demonstration.
The term pistis “can be rightly translated as proof, argument, reasoning, persuasion, belief, trust, faith, conviction, obligation, and conﬁdence”.10 Understanding
this term as employed in the Posterior Analytics simply as “belief” or “conviction”
involves major interpretative difﬁculties, primarily because pistis is said to come in
degrees, but belief, a propositional attitude, is binary; one either believes a
proposition or one does not.
In order to support the thesis that Aristotle’s theories of demonstration and
rhetorical argument are two aspects of an integrated account of argument, inference, belief, knowledge, and action, the present paper considers the term as
employed in epistemological context of the Posterior Analytics in light of the way
Aristotle uses the term in the Rhetoric. I argue that the term is what Aristotle would
call a pros hen equivocal.11 Like “healthy” or “being,” it can mean many different

9 For a similar view concerning logos, restricted to its use in Ethica Nicomachea, see Burnet (1914)
6–7.
10 Garver (2004) 3.
11 Pros hen equivocals are “not all referred to in respect to one thing nor as species of a single
genus, nor in a totally equivocal way. For they are all referred to with reference to one that is
primary, as is ‘medical’; for we say that a soul, body, instrument, and action are medical, but it is
what is medical in the primary sense that is strictly speaking medical. The primary one is that of
which the deﬁnition is contained in all, for example a medical instrument is one that would be used
by a medical practitioner, but the deﬁnition of the tool is not implicit in that of the medical
practitioner. So in all cases we look for what is primary” (EE VII 1236a16–23). Following Owen
(1960), the literature on pros hen equivocity has been enormous. See especially Shields (1999) and
Ward (2008).
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things, but all of its senses derive from a core sense to which implicit reference is
made, and none of the derivative senses can be fully understood without a
recognition of that. The core sense of pistis as understood in Posterior Analytics, De
Anima, and the Rhetoric is not that of a logical relation in which cognitively
grasped propositions stand in respect to one another, but the result of an act of
socially embedded interpersonal communication, a willing acceptance of guidance offered in respect to action. Even when pistis seems to have an exclusively
epistemological sense, this focal meaning of pistis is implicit; to have pistis in a
proposition is at least in part a willingness to accept that proposition as a basis for
some kind of activity (albeit possibly theoretical) as a result of some kind of
communicative act.

Pistis Comes in Degrees
As noted above, pistis is sometimes translated as “belief.” Belief is normally understood as an all or nothing affair. One either believes or one does not. If one
believes, and the belief has the appropriate justiﬁcation behind it, one knows. To
talk of degrees of belief is to make a categorical mistake. That is not of course to
deny that there can be degrees of certainty. But such cases are standardly dealt
with by understanding the propositional content as qualiﬁed by probability. To
believe that it will rain tomorrow, without certainty, is the same as believing that it
is likely to rain tomorrow. It is not to believe only a little bit that it will rain
tomorrow.12
This notion of belief is not wholly unfamiliar to Aristotle. He refers to the taking
of something as true as a hupolepsis,13 which, in accordance with its core, literal
sense (“grasp”) is an all or nothing affair. Pistis as Aristotle employs it, however, is

12 An alternative way of dealing with such issues is to supplement the notion of belief with that of
a different propositional attitude: credence. The one who strongly suspects that it will rain
tomorrow does not believe that it will rain, but has a higher degree of credence in regard to the
proposition that it will rain than she does to the proposition that it will not rain. The advantage of
this account is that it does not require a mysterious act of will prior to belief in a less than certain
proposition; rather, one’s degree of credence needs to reach a tipping point, after which belief
automatically follows. McCready-Flora (2011) understands Aristotle’s notion of pistis as something
like credence. I suggest below that this view commits Aristotle to an implausibly complex account
of human perceptual belief.
13 Moss and Schwab (2019) argue convincingly that for both Plato and Aristotle hupolepsis, not
doxa, corresponds to ‘belief’ as employed in contemporary epistemology, “the generic attitude of
taking something to be the case”.
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neither synonymous with hupolepsis nor can it be a necessary and sufﬁcient
condition, for Aristotle makes clear that pistis comes in degrees.
At APo. I 2.72a25–32 Aristotle writes:
Since we have pistis in and know a fact (to pragma) only by virtue of having the sort of
deduction that we call a demonstration, and this is so by virtue of the fact that those [premises] on which the deduction is based are so, the principles must not only be already known,
either all or some of them, but must be known to a greater extent. For it is always the case that
that by which something belongs [to something else] belongs to it more. So if we know and
have pistis in something by virtue of the principles, we know and have pistis in them to a
greater extent, because we know the posterior things, too, through them.14

On this basis Aristotle concludes that there must be maximal pistis in regard to the
principles of the sciences. They are ametapeista; the pistis that we have in them
cannot be overturned (72a32–b4).
The context of the passage is Aristotle’s review of the requirements for
demonstration, the sort of inference that serves to reveal the causes of universal
necessary truths. The principles at issue are the ultimate premises of these demonstrations; these premises express the ultimate causes of the conclusions. At
71b30–33, Aristotle emphasizes that the principles must be more known (gnorimos)
than the demonstrated conclusions; the idea is that if a feature of the world is to be
made intelligible by showing why it must be the case, it can only be on the basis of
showing how it logically follows from certain truths that do not themselves demand an answer to the question of why they are the case. The intelligibility of the
premises imparts intelligibility to what is inferred on their basis. Aristotle’s argument for the existence of such truths (APo. I 3.72b18–32) sets the pattern for subsequent foundationalist arguments: if there were no such foundations,
demonstrative inference would be either inﬁnite or circular, and on such bases
“one could prove anything”. Topics I 2.101b9–4, however, on one plausible
reading, indicates that one comes to know the principles themselves through
inferences of a different sort, that is, through dialectical arguments. The premises
of dialectical arguments are not scientiﬁc principles (for these are the conclusions
of the dialectical arguments at issue), but are endoxa, beliefs that are held by most
people, or by those whose expertise is recognized. Dialectical argument is not
linear, for which reason these inferences serve as coherentist justiﬁcations of the
principles.15 This is the case whether Aristotle ascribes a certain prima facie
epistemological validity to the endoxa,16 or whether he thinks that which views are
commonly held within one’s community is an accidental matter. Either way, the
14 Here and elsewhere the translation is by the author.
15 See Goldin (2013).
16 Bolton (1990).
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principles of the sciences need to be argued for, and the premises of such an
argument will have a kind of special epistemological status that the scientiﬁc
principles themselves will not have, at least in the case of those who have not yet
achieved expertise in the sciences. Aristotle’s way of putting it is to say that these
premises are better known to us but less well known in themselves.17 Scientiﬁc
principles, in contrast, will be better known in themselves but less well known in
respect to us.
Aristotle uses comparatives to indicate that more foundational objects of
knowledge have more intelligibility than less foundational objects of knowledge.
Can we understand Aristotle’s assertion that we have more pistis in the principles
in a parallel manner? If so, Aristotle’s point would be that the pistis we have in the
principles is the foundation or cause of the pistis that we have in the demonstrative
conclusions. Insofar as there are no principles of the principles, the pistis we have
in the principles would be generated from the principles themselves. This is
apparently the interpretation of Philoponus, who calls the ﬁrst principles of the
sciences autopistoi, sometimes translated as “self-evident.”18 The phrase ultimately derives from Proclus, who employs it in his commentary on Euclid’s Elements to refer a feature of the Euclidean principles, that they are kataphaneis
(75.16–17) or enargeis (194.7; 255.17) (evident, manifest) in their own right. The idea
here would be that the principles do not require justiﬁcation, but the truth of
derivative propositions is justiﬁed on the basis of the principles. Such an interpretation, according to which the more intelligible premises are foundational to
justiﬁcation, is untenable, for Aristotle takes ﬁrst principles to be foundational in
the order of explanation, not in the order of justiﬁcation.19
McCready-Flora recognizes that APo. I 2.72a25–32 talks about pistis as something that can come in greater or lesser degrees and accordingly takes pistis to be
something analogous to our “credence.” What exactly this credence is, on his
account, is unclear, but it seems to be something like a disposition or inclination to
believe a proposition. It is not binary and accepts the more and less. If one gives
enough credence to a proposition, a threshold is passed, and one believes it.
McCready-Flora understands the process by appealing to the metaphor of
17 Top. VI 4.141b2–142a12; APr. II 23.68b35–37; APo. I 2.71b32; Phys. I 1.184a16–20; Metaph. Ζ 3.
1029b3–12.
18 McKirahan (2008) passim renders it as “self–guaranteeing” but this suggests that on Philoponus’ understanding of Aristotle, a proposition is to be initially approached with skepticism and
ought not be accepted unless it comes with a guarantee, which is derived either from its own
character or from some other source. This brings to mind Stoic epistemology, according to which a
proposition must be assented to, on the basis of some evidence, prior to belief, and there is no
evidence that Philoponus understands Aristotle in this way.
19 Burnyeat (1981).
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hydraulics; given enough pressures, things pop, and belief results.20 Given multiple premises, it makes sense that some premises might have more credence than a
single proposition that is justiﬁed on their basis. The problem remains however
that according to Aristotle, the principles of the sciences do not justify the
demonstrated conclusions; they explain them. Aristotle maintains that sometimes
it is the demonstrated conclusions that justify the foundational premises, as when,
in Aristotle’s famous example, we prove that the planets are near on the basis of the
fact that they do not twinkle (APo. I 13.78a30–38). These derivative propositions
would seem to be the ones with more credence.
Moss and Schwab likewise recognize that pistis comes in degrees and hence
cannot be the same as hupolepsis. They tentatively suggest that “perhaps then
pistis is related to hupolepsis as the conscious psychological manifestation or
accompaniment of the epistemic state: conviction or conﬁdence”.21 But this
interpretation, according to which every belief is accompanied by a feeling of
surety or security, lacks textual or philological support.
In an earlier paper, I offered the following proposal: the pistis that Aristotle has
in mind at 72a25-32 is not the conviction that a principle holds, but that it is, in fact,
a principle.22 I now see more clearly now that such a noetic grasp has qualitative
superiority, but Aristotle is here saying that the scientist has the same cognitive
relation, pistis, to both principle and derivative proposition, but has it to a greater
degree in the ﬁrst case.
So what does Aristotle mean by pistis here? In order to clarify this we ﬁrst turn
to consider the term as used outside of epistemological contexts: in pre–Aristotelian philosophical writings, in Aristotle’s De Anima, and in his Rhetoric.

Pistis as Pros Hen Equivocal
Pistis is derived from peithein, to persuade. Peithein has the active sense; pisteuein
the passive (Mourelatos 1970). In Homer and in other pre–philosophical Greek
literature, pistis is an attitude of trust, arising through speech, by which one can be
led by another.23
20 McCready-Flora (2011) 168. Although in personal communication McCready-Flora promises a
more adequate account in future publications, I here cite the dissertation because of its importance
in being one the few attempts to account for what Aristotle means in taking pistis to admit of
degrees.
21 Moss and Schwab (2019) n. 63.
22 Goldin (2013) 212–213.
23 See Mourelatos (1970) 144–146.
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The first philosophical use of the notion pistis in which it carries some epistemological weight is found in Parmenides’ poem. In the exposition of the way of
Truth the goddess repeatedly invokes pistis as that by which coming to be is
excluded from what is (8.12–13 and 27–28). Fragment 2 declares that Peitho attends
truth. It would ill ﬁt the guiding metaphor – that of the goddess leading the youth
through open gates – to take this to be a reference to the unshakeable cognitive
grasp of self–evident logical truth. Rather, as Mourelatos has argued, “the use of
the peith–words in Parmenides suggest that the cognitive concept of ‘belief’ (at
least in Greek thought) depends on a paradigm of ‘faith’ and ‘trust’”.24 Our
knowledge that “it is” arises not through a solitary evaluation of the truth value of
propositional content but through an elenchus, a type of persuasion through
working through inferences in language.
Pistis, in this sense, is the goal of the rhetorician. As Plato’s Gorgias makes
clear, the goal of rhetoric was commonly taken to be the inﬂuencing of the actions
of others, whether in the service of others, as when he says that he convinces the
patient to submit to the knife (456b), or for the acquisition of power.25
We turn to Aristotle. DA III 3 concerns the psychological faculty of phantasia,
often translated as “imagination.” This faculty encompasses a great deal; it is what
is responsible for those cognitive acts that go beyond perception and integration of
perceptual information, but do not involve the exercise of intelligence or knowledge. Aristotle argues that phantasia is not a variety of doxa, for “pistis accompanies doxa (since it is not possible to have doxai in those things for which one
does not have pistis), yet, while pistis is not found in any wild beast, phantasia is
found in many of them. Another point is that pistis is entailed by every doxa, and
having been convinced (to pepeisthai) is entailed by every instance of pistis, and
24 See Mourelatos (1970) 163.
25 The exception that proves the rule is Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. Gorgias’ speech reverses the
conventional condemnation of Helen by virtue of a radical re–understanding of logos, not as
something that one follows of one’s own accord, but as a compelling force. That this is presented as
paradox shows that the standard notion of pistis is one of willing guidance from another and what
that other says, not cognitive compulsion. For Plato, too, pistis has a root sense of reliance and
trust, even in epistemological passages. In the Divided Line of the Republic (511e), pistis is a kind of
placeholder, meant to distinguish that by which we relate to things from that by which we relate to
their images. Plato’s point cannot be that our conviction concerning sensible images lacks the sort
of justiﬁcation available in the case of our conviction concerning physical objects. That is not
Plato’s concern. I suggest that the distinction between things like apples and the images of apples
is that the former have a kind of pragmatic use for us. I suggest that Plato chooses the term pistis to
indicate this difference in stance to us. Although neither the reﬂection of the apple nor the apple
itself is a real apple, insofar as neither conforms to Parmenidean standards of being, our actions
depend on taking the apple to be what it appears to be, in a way that is not the case for the image.
Reaching for the apple results from a kind of trust that things are what they seem.
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logos follows every instance of persuasion, but while phantasia is found in some
wild beasts, logos is not” (DA III 3.428a19–b4). Doxa is here identiﬁed as the
cognitive state of one who has pistis; hupolepsis is a more general cognitive state,
the genus to which doxa belongs. Aristotle goes on to argue that it is possible to
have a phantastia that is contradictory to a proposition in respect to which one has
pistis. Building on the etymology of phantasia, according to which phantasia denotes the faculty by which something appears (phainetai) as something or other,
Aristotle offers as an example that “the sun appears (phainetai) to be a foot across”
yet “there is conviction (pisteutai) that is it is greater than the inhabited world”. The
faculty of phantasia, then, is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for being
capable of hupolepsis. Hupolepsis is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for
pistis.26
In the example at hand, the object of phantasia seems to be a that–clause, a
proposition, “the sun is a foot across,” which is formulable in language.27 Hupolepsis, on this account, is like phantasia, a propositional cognitive attitude, but
unlike phantasia it requires a form of cognition unique to human beings.28 Because
phantasia may lack pistis, as it does in nonhuman animals, pistis is not simply a
grasp of a proposition as true. That which is involved in pistis, but not phantasia, is
being guided to grasp the proposition as true, by means of a certain activity that is
an exercise of rationality, a kind of discourse. Animals can be led to change their
minds, but not in this way, as it involves logos, which is absent from animals. So,
we are led to ask: What it is to have logos, if not the ability to grasp propositions?
Logos cannot have the sense of inference; if that were the case, why would Aristotle
claim that doxa of what one perceives necessarily results from inference?29 Logos
also has the sense of “language”; Aristotle’s stock sample deﬁnition of a human
being as an animal having logos is less accurately translated as “rational animal”
than “an animal that speaks”. But how is language required for having a doxa? As I
already noted, Aristotle does not think that language is necessary for the grasp of
26 Aristotle is not saying that a hupolepsis entails pistis, as is suggested by Moss and Schwab
(2019). Pistis requires something more. That something more, I argue, is the proclivity to act or
make some sort of commitment in accordance with one’s hupolepsis, resulting from some
communicative act.
27 See Modrak (1989) 101.
28 For textual evidence that supports this claim, see De Ins. 2.460b18, 26–27; DA III 3.428a12–15;
De Motu 7.701a32; on this see Bolton (2005). An alternative account, developed by Wedin and
endorsed by Caston, understands phantasia as “representation” (Caston 2006; Wedin 1988). This
attributes to Aristotle the unlikely view that among animals only human beings are aware of facts.
29 McCready-Flora (2011) 13–59 argues that Aristotle’s point here is that doxa requires the rational
evaluation of potential beliefs, by gauging the credence that is to be placed in each. I ﬁnd this
implausible, as it would require that all beliefs (doxai) arise from such evaluations, including the
most straightforward doxai, as that there is an apple before one.
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propositional content. Logos must be understood as what Aristotle says it is when
he explains why only human beings have logos. It is a communicative act by which
members of a community persuade each other to act in certain ways. In some cases
(for example, the phantasia that the sun is more than a foot across), what one is
being led to is a kind of inner afﬁrmation, and the speech that does the leading
might be one’s own inner speech,30 but the root sense of a rational agent’s being
willingly led by rational discourse is again at play. This state of being rationally led
by what another says is the core sense of pistis, in relation to which other senses are
to be understood. Pistis is a Pros Hen equivocal; what Owen would call the “focal
meaning” of the term pistis is this sense of being so led.

Pistis and Rhetoric
We turn to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in which the term pistis is especially prominent.
Rhetorical speeches are distinguished primarily by the context in which they are
uttered; one person speaks before others, attempting by his or her speech to lead
others to do certain things, within the context of the life of the political community.31 Pistis is a common term in this work, referring both to the cognitive
state aimed at within the auditors and the resources32 by which the speaker
induces that state. We have seen that the term primarily refers not to a propositional attitude but to the state in which one is guided by logos to act in a certain
way. We shall see that this is the focal sense of pistis in the Rhetoric as well,
although this is not often reﬂected in how scholars translated the term. Even
scholars like Garver and McCabe (who have emphasized that the Rhetoric concerns itself with the sorts of arguments that cannot be abstracted from their social
and political contexts and the concrete aims in which those arguments are
uttered) nonetheless are apt to translate pistis in either the sense of being a
30 Aristotle discusses a kind of inner speech when he says that one part of the soul has logos
insofar as it directs another part of the soul, which has logos insofar as it can be persuaded to follow
(EN III 2.1102b13–30).
31 Aristotle seems to distinguish rhetorical arguments (enthymemes) not on the basis of the social
context in which they are given but on the basis of the nature of their premises: the premises are for
the most part, not necessary, and concern the sort of thing about which we deliberate (Rhet. I 2.
1057a14–33). But this gets things backwards, insofar as it suggests that rhetorical arguments are
useful in practical contexts insofar as its arguments concern the sort of contingencies that we
encounter in deliberation. Rather, rhetoric is primarily concerned with action, which is why the
sorts of premises it employs are the sorts of premises that are appropriate when deliberating
(contingencies).
32 Grimaldi (1957), (1972) 59–68, (1980) 349–356 holds that pisteis include both source material
and means; his argument is countered by Wikramanayake (1961).
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means, with a logical term like “proof,” or the sense of being an end, with an
epistemological term like “conviction.”33 Terms like “proof” or “conviction” are
not incorrect translations but terms like “proof” or “conviction” suggest that a
speaker leads an auditor to action by means of uttering a logos with a determinate
cognitive content abstracted from the embodied and social reality of the communicators, evaluated by the auditor on “logical” grounds, and, once accepted,
inserted as a premise in a practical syllogism. Unfortunately, there is no English term
or phrase that will serve as a ﬁtting translation for pistis as both cognitive state and
means for inducting that cognitive state, though perhaps “rational guidance” might
be close, insofar as the term “guidance” is contrasted with compulsion, and refers to
both that which guides and the state in which one is guided.
The introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric tells us that the “rhetorical study, in the
strict sense, is concerned with the modes of persuasion. Persuasion is clearly a sort
of demonstration, since we are most fully persuaded when we consider a thing to
have been demonstrated”.34 He clariﬁes the relationship between inference and
pistis in the following chapter with these famous lines:
There are three kinds of pistis offered by logos. For some consist in the ethos of the speaker,
some in the manner in which the listener is disposed [to act], and some in the logos, insofar as
it proves or seems to prove something. Pistis comes from the ethos when the logos is related in
a way that makes the speaker out to be worthy of pistis. We have pistis in relation to worthy
people more, and more quickly, than in relation to others, this is true on the whole true about
anything, and is absolutely true when there is no precision to be found but there is room for
disagreement. This very thing must come about from the logos, not from presuppositions
concerning what sort of person the speaker is. It is not the case, as some writers on the art of
rhetoric would have it, that the worthiness of the speaker is not to be considered a matter of
the [rhetorical] craft, since it contributes nothing towards being worthy of pistis [to pithanon];
rather, ethos is so to speak the most important kind of pistis.

33 See for example McCabe (1994) 141: “Rhetoric is about conviction (pistis) and conviction is
demonstration of a kind – for we are convinced most of all when we accept that the point has been
demonstrated”.
34 Aristotle here reinforces the link we have already seen in the Posterior Analytics between pistis
and demonstration, but here, as elsewhere in the Rhetoric, apodeixis cannot have a technical
sense, neither the sense in the Posterior Analytics, according to which the premises must express
causes (I 2.71b19–22), nor that found in the Topics, according to which the premises must be true
and primary in order of justiﬁcation, that is, such as to warrant pistis without being inferred on the
basis of anything more basic (I 1.100a20–b19). This is because the premises of rhetorical enthymemes are not all unquestionable, and those that are unquestionable are so only for certain
auditors listening to a particular speech. Aristotle here, as elsewhere (on which see Lloyd 1992),
employs apodeixis in an older, looser sense, to refer to a certain kind of proof that does not
necessarily conform to the strict standards of the Posterior Analytics.
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Pistis arises on account of the listeners when they are guided [proachthosin] by the logos into a
pathos. The decisions [kriseis] that we offer when we are upset are not the same as those when
we are feeling good; and likewise, when we are feeling love and feeling hate. . . . People have
pistis on account of the logos when we have proven a truth (or an apparent truth) from
considerations that have pistis [ek pithanon] about the matters at hand. (Rhet. I 2.1356a1–20)

Ethos, pathos, and rhetorical argument (enthymeme) work together seamlessly, as
integrated components of a single rhetorical speech. Human beings are such that
when they deliberate together, their estimation of the virtue of the speakers and
their emotional reactions are under normal circumstances reliable (albeit not
infallible) gauges of the truth of the premises, and, accordingly, or the conclusions
that follow from them.35 Rhetorical arguments can be misleading, sometimes
intentionally so, but that does not invalidate them as a means for public
deliberation.
Ethos, pathos, and enthymeme have pistis as their goal, and for this reason each
is called a pistis (in a derivative sense). We are told elsewhere by Aristotle that this
pistis, the goal of rhetorical speech, is threefold, insofar as there are three types of
hearers, classiﬁed on the basis of the task before them in the political context in
which they ﬁnd themselves as auditors: “The listener must be either be a spectator or
one who makes a decision (krites), and this decision concerns either past or future
events. The one whose decision concerns future events is a member of the assembly,
the one who decides about past events is a member of the jury: while the one who
makes a determination concerning the skill of the rhetorician is a spectator. So
necessarily there are three kinds of speeches given by rhetoricians (1) deliberative,
(2) judicial, (3) and ceremonial” (Rhet. I 3.1358b2–8). The role of the ﬁrst kind of
auditor is to take part in decisions about what course of action to take. The role of the
second is to decide who did what, in a legal context. The role of the third is to praise
or blame. All of these kinds of actions necessarily rest on the determination of certain

35 “If the rhetorician succeeds in presenting himself as a trustworthy person, the audience forms a
second–order judgment that what is put forward by a credible person should be accepted”. Rapp and
Wagner (2013) 25. Surely Aristotle recognized the importance of such second–order judgments in
evaluating the reliability of the assertions of others. He himself takes certain assertions to have the
status of endoxa on account of the expertise or virtue of their speakers. But I differ from Rapp’s view
that an audience necessarily forms a second–order assertion when the character of a speaker contributes to the pistis of a rhetorical speech. Just as the default is for a child to belief a parent, without
an independent evaluation of his credulity, so too the speech of one whose words manifest good
character may exercise pistis in an unmediated way. See Schmitt (1998) and Garver (1994) 146: “It is …
obvious why character or ethos persuades: the end of rhetoric is belief and trust, and belief and trust
attach primarily to people whom we trust, and only derivatively to propositions which we believe”.
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beliefs (what, in DA, Aristotle calls hupolepseis).36 But these determinations are for
the sake of actions (a military strike, a legal conviction, the bestowing of an honor,
verbal or otherwise). Here, again, pistis is to be understood as guidance by which an
auditor is willingly led by speech to perform a certain action.
This explains why ethos, pathos, and enthymeme are all pisteis, in the derivative
sense of being means. They are all ways in which a speech is employed to rationally
guide others. This is because ethical character, for Aristotle, is a disposition to set for
oneself certain ends and to deliberate concerning how to achieve those ends, and it
is by reason that we do that. Although pathos involves an element of bodily response
to stimuli, it also involves a rational apprehension of the nature of that stimulus,
which is why the passions to which one is subject are a sign of one’s character.
Further, pathos is often by its nature a disposition to act in a certain way.37
Aristotle identifies enthymeme as a pistis in the sense of being a means by
relating it to pistis in the sense of the goal to be achieved in the auditor:
[I]t is clear that the method that is internal to the art concerns pisteis, and pistis is a kind of
demonstration, for we have pistis (pisteuein) to the greatest extent when we take something to
have been demonstrated), and an enthymeme is a rhetorical demonstration – and this is, so to
speak, the most important of the pisteis, and an enthymeme is a kind of syllogism,38 and it
belongs to dialectic – either as a whole or part of it – to look into every kind of inference,
equally. (Rhet. I 1.1355a3–10)

This passage raises a cluster of problems. Aristotle says that a pistis is a kind of
discourse that leads to pistis. Aristotle says that there is pistis (as a cognitive state)
in the highest degree when it arises by virtue of that sort of pistis that we call a
demonstration, an apodeixis. Aristotle is here using the term apodeixis to refer to
36 This is why at Rhet. II 1.1377b20–24 Aristotle says that rhetorical speeches are aimed at
members of the audience making a krisis, a discrimination. But every choice (prohairesis) rests on
determining the facts of a circumstance, so there is no reason to claim, as does Rapp (2009)
583 that “the aim of rhetorical persuasion is a certain judgment (krisis), not an action or practical
decision (prohairesis)”. In a sense every decision is a krisis, for it is a rational determination that
this, rather than that, be done. See Smith (1998) 49: “Indeed, what results from taking counsel
about a course of action is called a prohairesis in the Ethics but called a krisis in the Rhetoric. The
only difference would seem to be that a private taking counsel with oneself is more the concern of
the Ethics whereas public taking counsel with others is more the concern of rhetoric, in particular,
of sumbouleutike or consultative rhetoric”.
37 As Garver (1994) 145–146 puts it, “Why emotion persuades is clear. Most emotions include some
disposition to act as part of their deﬁnition. When the rhetorician evokes an emotion, the disposition to act follows”.
38 The sense is not the enthymeme is a determinate species of syllogism (as, on the traditional
interpretation, it is a syllogism leaving premises unstated), but that it is an inference that does not
necessarily meet strict standards of deductive validity. It is a syllogism, sort of. On this see
Burnyeat (1994, 1996).
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a kind of argument that is aimed, not at strictly theoretical knowledge, but also at
inducing others to act in a certain way. This usage has ample precedent. As Barnes
has emphasized in the context of his argument that the apodeixeis discussed in the
Posterior Analytics are essentially didactic, the root sense of apodeiknumi is “to
show” or “to make public”.39 Thus, in a number of pre-Aristotelian medical texts,
various explanations of physiological conditions are referred to as “demonstrations”, even though they fall far short of necessity and other conditions for
demonstration in the narrower sense.40 The medical authors show both the nature
of certain illnesses and ailments, and, at the same time, their medical expertise, in
public speeches intended to persuade the auditors to choose them over their rivals
when needing to consult a physician. Similarly, in calling an enthymeme a
demonstration, Aristotle is employing this older, more inclusive sense of demonstration, which comprehends both the proofs and explanations offered by scientists and other experts, and inferences employed in rhetorical speeches. Certain
syllogisms are demonstrations in the narrower technical sense on account of
certain features of their premises: they can have a special epistemological status
and indicate states of affairs with a foundational ontological or causal status. But
they and other arguments that are demonstrations in a looser sense play a central
role in rhetorical theory on account of their unique and important effect on their
auditors.
An enthymeme is a pistis because it is a logos that persuades. In accordance
with Aristotle’s understanding of the nature and purpose of rhetorical speeches,
and the prevailing nontechnical pre-Aristotelian sense of the term, a pistis by
which the rhetorician convinces another is not primarily to be understood as an
abstract formal structure of linked propositions that has a justiﬁcatory role within
an internal body of cognized propositions; it is rather a discourse by which one
person is willingly led by another to do one of the three sorts of actions with which
rhetoric is concerned: to make a decision concerning the affairs of the polis, to
convict or to acquit, or to praise or blame. Pistis, understood as the cognitive result
in the auditor that is the result of the effective use of all three varieties of pistis in

39 Barnes (1969) 138–139, reprinted as (1975) 78–79.
40 As Lloyd (1979) 86–102 has argued, these same texts were akin to the rhetorical displays
(epideixeis) of the sophists and professional orators. They employ the techniques of rhetoric, and
their main function often seems less the revelation of how things are than the establishment of the
expertise of the speaker, in contrast to that of his rivals. The goal in such cases is reliance on the
speaker, in medical and perhaps other social contexts. Given that there is no sharp boundary
between demonstration as a formal explanatory structure and demonstration as persuasive
speech, the demonstrations of the doctors were ﬁrst and foremost a verbal action leading to
peithein, persuading another.
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the sense of means, is the state in which the auditor is led by rhetorical speech to
perform one or more of these kinds of actions.
Aristotle defines logos in the strict sense as a matter of signiﬁcant discursive
communication (as Int. 4.16b26–28 puts it). An enthymeme, though, is more than a
logos; in calling it a demonstration (Rhet. I 9.1355a4–7) Aristotle is noting that it is
an inference that at least to some extent41 conforms to standards of rationality. This
is why appeals to ethos and pathos that effectively inﬂuence the audience’s beliefs
or behavior, but do so without a proper enthymeme, fall outside of the rhetorical
art (Rhet. I 1.1354a11–18). Enthymeme, which Aristotle calls the guts (soma) of pistis
(Rhet. I 1.1354a15), is not just any manner of inﬂuencing by words, but must be
rational guidance. As rational, it must conform to certain norms.42 Put otherwise,
the goal of pistis, toward which rhetorical speech is oriented, is not merely an
external action, it must be an action that is arrived at through rational deliberation.
Whether or not that goal is reached is the measure of the effectiveness of the
speech. Pistis as guidance can be understood as more or less effective, which is
why it admits of quantitative variation. The pisteis that result from ethos and
pathos will likewise admit of degree. For ethos and pathos too admit of quantitative variation. The speaker can be more or less virtuous. The auditor can be more
or less emotionally affected by a speech. It stands to reason that these quantitative
differences can lead the auditor to be more or less susceptible to acting as the
speaker wishes.
We have seen that, according to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ethos, pathos, and
enthymeme are called pisteis insofar as they lead to pistis, in the sense by which the
term refers to the result of effective rhetorical communication. Pistis is pros hen in
relation to the disposition to heed a certain speaker, and then do what she leads
one to do, within a political context.43 Pistis is the result of an act of communication
that leads to some action.
This has implications for Aristotle’s epistemology and philosophy of mind. The
communication that leads to pistis might be overt, as when one human being
speaks to another, but for all his aversion to metaphor, Aristotle is not shy about
talking about one aspect of the soul speaking to another: the inner logos too is a
communicative act (Burnet 1914). A mere hupolepsis might have the status of a

41 On this qualiﬁcation see Burnyeat (1994, 1996).
42 See Dow (2005) 37–57.
43 As González (2006) 118 puts it, “If rhetoric studies the means for persuasive speech, surely its
practical goal is to persuade or dissuade the audience; hence, in its polis setting and at the level of
civic action, rhetoric becomes a legitimate object of interest in the study of ‘animal motion,’ though
here the zoon in question is one that possesses phone and logos and is eminently politikon”.
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passing thought, considered as a kind of inner communication in which some state
of affairs is registered, but in which there may be little in the way of causal efﬁcacy;
I suggest that Aristotle intends to contrast pistis with such a logos when he calls it a
“strong hupolepsis” (Top. IV 6.126b18). It has some strength; how much strength
depends on various factors (including but not restricted to, the pisteis of ethos,
pathos, and enthymeme). A high degree of pistis involves some cognitive force;
less pistis involves less force, perhaps not enough to counter the pull of an animal
desire largely devoid of logos.44 Aristotle makes this explicit in arguing that doxa
can overpower knowledge in regard to action.45 As we have seen, doxa is the
cognitive correlate of pistis. By deﬁnition, doxa involves being led to perform an
action of some kind. There is no reason why this might override a mode of belief
(hupolepsis) that is more divorced from the potential to act. The degree of pistis has
nothing to do with whether one’s cognitive attitude in regard to a proposition has
reached a level by which one subscribes to or believes it; it has to do with whether it
is such as has enough strength to sufﬁce for being responsible for doing
something.46

Pistis and Demonstration
Can the term pisteuein in the Posterior Analytics passage discussed above be
understood along these lines? To be sure, it is hard to see how pistis that results
from, say, a geometrical demonstration is fundamentally social. Nonetheless, we
ought to remind ourselves that there is no place in Aristotle’s ontology for free–
standing theoretical bodies of propositions structured by entailment relations. A
proof, like an enthymeme, a rhetorical syllogism, is a logos, something that one
says. A science, considered as a body of demonstrations, is constituted by the
things that people say when teaching or explaining, and this happens within a
social context.
This is not to deny that there is a difference between the sorts of demonstrations offered by the medical writers and those offered by mathematicians. The
student can see for herself the truth of the principles of the mathematicians, for
44 Desire with logos is a result of pistis; see Rhet. I 11.1370a18–27. For desire exercising a pull
without pistis opposed to logos with pistis, see EE II 8.1124b1–2.
45 See EN VII 3.1146b26–30.
46 Cf. van Eemeren–Grootendorst–Henkemans (1996) 4: “Argumentation is aimed at increasing
(or decreasing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader”.
‘Acceptability’ comes very close to the core sense of pistis if one understands ‘standpoint’ here as a
stance orienting one toward action, not, as they understand it, as an “opinion . . . about a speciﬁc
subject” (2).
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which reason they are considered by the Neoplatonists to be autopistoi, self–
evident. This is not the case with medical ﬁrst principles; those are established on
the basis of how well they work in explaining the phenomena that need explaining,
in comparison to the principles advocated in rival accounts.47 No doubt this is why
rhetorical techniques are found in the medical texts, while they would be out of
place in a mathematical text. The speaker is not only saying “this is how things
are”; he is also saying “trust me, not those others”. The need for such trust becomes
even more acute in the context of deliberative rhetoric, where a speaker can induce
trust only through attending to ethos in addition to the logical force of the argument.48 Aristotle contrasts the sort of pistis involved in deliberation from which
one holds in regard to the theoretical sciences: “The reason why mathematical
logos do not involve ethe is that choice is not present, for there is no ‘for the sake of
which’” (Rhet. III 16.1417a19–21). Nonetheless, in each case principles are secured
through the same kind of cognitive grasp: noesis, which, as a number of scholars in
recent decades have urged, cannot be understood in Aristotle as a kind of self–
certifying intuition, but as an achievement by which one comes to see that a certain
principle will supply a certain middle term allowing for a demonstration.49 Aristotle makes no distinction between noesis in the case of medicine and that at work
in mathematics. Each arises through a demonstration which is a pistis, leading us
to rely on and trust the expertise of the teacher, as well as the group of scholars with
whom the teacher is allied. This is why at Rhetoric I 1.1355a24–27 Aristotle emphasizes that in the absence of the resources of rhetoric, scientiﬁc expertise (that is,
command of the formal elements of demonstration) might be insufﬁcient for
bringing about pistis in an uneducated audience. “Even if one had the utmost in
scientiﬁc knowledge, for some people, persuasion on that basis is not easy. For
scientiﬁc logos is teaching, but <in this case> this is impossible”. There must
already be trust in the experts.
Aristotle himself displays this sort of trust when, in regard to the question of
the number of heavenly spheres that must be posited, he defers to mathematical
authority (Metaph. Λ 8). This is not, of course, to say that the notion of conﬁdence
or trust in the veracity of the propositional content of what is said is absent in

47 Because rhetorical and dialectical contexts do not permit theoretical teaching, the arguments
found in those contexts must rest on views all share in common; see Top. 101a31–34, 159a28–30
and Rhet. I 1.1355a24–29.
48 As Garver (2004) 142 writes, “when ethos is the most important source of belief, we believe
what someone says largely because we trust the person making the assertions”.
49 See Lesher (1973); Sorabji (1993).
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Aristotle’s thought, but there is a continuity between that trust and the socially
embedded persuasive speech of those who say those things.50
The noetic grasp of a first principle is not blind reliance on authority. One
does in fact come to see the truth of a first principle for oneself. But, although
Aristotle never works this through, he surely recognized that such a grasp
arises from and remains embedded in a social context of teachers and
learners.51
This is why the pistis in derivative propositions is less than that in the principles. The trust that a conclusion has been demonstrated is derived from the trust
in the principles, which, to be sure, are derived from how the elements of the
network of derived conclusions hang together with themselves and with experience, but also from the epistemic authority earned by the teacher or expert who
identiﬁes them as principles, an authority, reinforced, as the case may be, by ethos
and pathos.

Conclusion
There is no such thing as a proposition, for Aristotle. There are logoi, and logoi are
actions, sayings. (Thus, at Int. 4.16b26–28, Aristotle deﬁnes logos by putting it in
the category of a sounding, a phone.) The whole of Aristotle’s Rhetoric is based on a
conception of logos as something said, by one person to another, for the sake of

50 On this cf. Garver (2004) 111, 126: “Just as the Greek work pistis applies to people whom we
believe and trust and equally to propositions that we believe, authority too applies to people as
well as propositions. . . Just as ethos can be either created by speech or by such externals as
antecedent reputation or the trappings of power, so there are rational or irrational authorities.
There can be personal authority with no propositional content or claims to truth: charisma is a
standard name for such authority”. Garver goes on to argue that ethically responsible obedience
involves following the reasoning of the authority (ibid.). This overstates things a bit. I might not be
able to follow the scientiﬁc research establishing a connection between human activity and
potentially catastrophic climate change, but that does not mean that accepting the scientiﬁc
consensus, and modifying my personal and political choices accordingly, is ethically irresponsible. Rather, in a well–functioning society, the ethically responsible thing to do is to trust in
recognized authorities. Aristotle himself does so, in deferring to endoxa that lie outside of his own
areas of expertise.
51 The point is made well by Reeve (unpublished) 22: “[It] is only within scientiﬁc communities or
communities of knowledge that, through complex processes of habituation and teaching, they are
produced: we learn science from other scientists (X 9 1180b28–34). But communities of knowledge,
both in Aristotle’s view and in reality, are parts of the political community and are regulated and
sustained by it”.
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certain socially embedded aims.52 People speak in order to inﬂuence the actions of
others. People say these things in the context of a polis, the necessary precondition
for nearly all teaching and learning. Aristotle’s understanding of the relationships
holding among speech, thought, and action is parallel to that of Isocrates, who
famously declared that “none of the things which are done with intelligence take
place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our
thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most
wisdom” (Nicocles 3.8).53 Speech, in its social context, is prior to thought, and
thought is prior to the action of the phronimos. The fundamentally social nature of
logos and pistis is often submerged in the way in which Aristotle discusses logic,
language, and learning, but an adequate account of Aristotelian epistemology must
appreciate how he understands knowledge to be grounded in communicative
practices.54
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